Assimi Goïta's new Mali: a genuine transition?

 

Since 2020, the Republic of Mali has been facing a political situation that, unfortunately, is not unfamiliar in its sixty years of post-colonial independence: a government installed by military coup, an ethnic-territorial confrontation between north and south aggravated by jihadism, a destabilising foreign presence and an economy severely weakened by sanctions and pandemics. 

 

However, both its supporters and certain sectors of the population point to the presence of some unprecedented elements as proof of a profound and positive change: the 'liberation' from French dependence in favour of a rapprochement with Russia, the adoption of an alternative pan-Africanism by replacing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with the brand new Alliance of Sahel States (AES), and the recent promulgation of a new constitution that the country had been waiting for thirty years. 

 

We examine how Assimi Goïta's government is dealing with the country’s serious problems, and we try to determine whether this is a genuine transition or the changes that have taken place represent yet another unfortunate repetition of history.

 

North-South conflict

 

Last January, the final burial of the Algiers Agreements, which put an end to the fourth Tuareg rebellion in 2015, represented the deep rift between Bamako and the independence fighters from the northern region of Azawad. The rebels, now grouped in the Permanent Strategic Framework, continue to demand autonomy and decentralisation of power, which would allow them to fulfil their hopes of self-government, frustrated since independence.

 

At the root of the long-standing disputes is the dual model of colonial administration. In Bamako and the rest of the northern territory - black, fertile and the centre of power - France pursued a policy of assimilation, while in the north - Arab/Tuareg, arid and with little presence of the state - it was the other way round. After independence in 1960, confrontation became inevitable and led to Tuareg rebellions in 1963 and 1990, which were put down militarily. The 1992 National Pact and the promises of decentralisation and integration of the irregular militia into the Malian army did not win the confidence of the northerners, who emigrated en masse to Muammar al-Gaddafi's Libya.

 

After almost two decades of relative peace, the 2012 military coup d'état brought instability back to the country. The rebels, grouped in the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), took advantage of the power vacuum to take up arms against the state. At the same time, the fall of the Gaddafi regime - following military intervention under the umbrella of the United Nations- led to the return of thousands of armed and radicalised guerrillas, who joined both the MNLA and the Islamist militia Ansar Dine. Although guided by different objectives, the agreement between the two groups allowed them to achieve important territorial conquests, even declaring the independence of the Islamic State of Azawad (without any international backing). However, cooperation between the two factions was problematic and short-lived, as their basic contradictions - especially over the application of Sharia law - led them to clash in the Battle of Gao. 

 

The victory of the jihadists and their advance southwards forced Bamako to ask for help from France, which landed in 2013 under a UN mandate with more than five thousand men in the framework of Operation Serval -later named Barkhane-, managing to repel the offensive and expel the jihadists to the porous northern border with Algeria. 

 

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The MNLA's recovery of some cities such as Kidal and Timbuktu and the decentralisation pacts contained in the 2015 Algiers Agreements seemed to put an end to the north-south conflict for a few years. However, excessive concessions to the pro-independence movement were among the reproaches levelled at the government of Ibrahim Boubakar Keita, and were one of the causes of the widespread mobilisations against him in 2019 and, ultimately, of the coup d'état in 2020 (and subsequent self-coup in 2021), the seed of the current situation. 

 

Fight against jihadism and new alliances

 

Despite the initial withdrawal of the jihadist groups thanks to the French troops, the fact is that they soon regained their importance in the central areas of the country and along the Niger River, represented mainly by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (linked to Al Qaeda) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (loyal to Daesh). The rise of these groups brought renewed instability, not only because of the frequent attacks but also because of the displacement of masses of people fleeing from them and rejected - often with clashes - by the populations of destination.

 

The growing violence led to the first disputes between the military junta and France, especially on how to combat terrorism, with Bamako including the rebels in the north in that concept. Demands for arms and military equipment were not met by Paris, which Bamako used as a reason to turn to Moscow, obtaining arms supplies and Wagner's paramilitary troops from the Kremlin. The alleged massacres committed by these mercenaries in various towns in the north, as well as the diplomatic tension with Paris -which caused the expulsion of the French ambassador- finally convinced president Macron, who ordered the definitive withdrawal of French troops from Mali by the end of 2022. Similarly, Malian demands led to the termination of the United Nations Mission (MINUSMA) in December 2023 and, more recently, the end of the European troop training operation (EUTM-Mali). With these departures, Bamako has clearly moved in favour of Moscow, with whom it has signed important bilateral relations, but it has also moved closer to Turkey, which is providing it with the drones that allowed it to recover Kidal after ten years in rebel hands. 

 

New international alliances have also led the junta to rethink its regional politics. Not surprisingly, its exit from the G5 Sahel (a strategic anti-terrorist forum that it was part of together with Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Chad) and, more recently, from ECOWAS, is a response to the strong pressure received from this regional organisation (led by Nigeria) which pushed for democratic recovery after the coups d'état. Since coming to power, Goïta has strongly favoured relations with Burkina Faso and Niger, countries in a similar situation - following their respective military coups - with which he intends to materialise an alternative patriotism and pan-Africanism to that of ECOWAS through the new Alliance of Sahel States, which is initially military in purpose - not surprisingly, it has already set up a common anti-terrorist force. However, its components do not renounce greater political integration - which has already led them to proclaim a confederation and should eventually lead them towards federation - and even economic integration - having proclaimed among their main objectives the creation of an alternative currency to the CFA franc.

 

Political and economic transition

 

The new military government has been trying for months to consolidate its position by calling for national reconciliation between all political factions. However, this goodwill has major shortcomings from the outset, leaving out the northern groups, which the junta brands as jihadists. 

Although focused on Bamako, Assimi Goïta's government does not advocate a very specific ideology, beyond patriotism, the fight against jihadism, pan-Africanism ‘from below’ and populist anti-colonialism, which it is convenient for him to stir up and with which he has won the support of the population for the time being. In fact, for months the population has not visibly opposed the continuation of the military government, considering it a necessary instrument for consolidating peace and obtaining the necessary stability after a decade of upheaval. 

 

This image of progress and democratic innovation would have been helped by the new Constitution adopted by referendum in mid-2023, which is characterised by a presidential system with term limits, a bicameral assembly that gives more participation to the regions, and a judicial system that combines ordinary courts with recognition of traditional authorities. It also proclaims the junta's pan-Africanist aspiration, recognising the possibility of ceding sovereignty through association or integration agreements ‘with a view to achieving African unity’. 

 

Despite democratic progress on paper, continued delays in calling presidential elections may significantly alter the social stability situation. Initially scheduled for February this year, they were postponed sine die by the junta as early as November 2023, citing technical problems in the implementation of the institutions derived from the new constitution and the ‘hijacking’ of the electoral roll by a French company. Although these problems seem to have been resolved today, there is still no date for the election of a new president. This is despite the fact that on 26 March the transition period legally expired, according to a decree signed by the government itself in 2022. For months, several leaders openly expressed their demand for the government to call elections as soon as possible, to which the junta reacted by temporarily suspending the activity of political parties, after having also dissolved the main student organisation and the important association of followers of the influential imam Mahmoud Dicko. 

 

The political unrest was compounded by the dire economic situation resulting from the pandemic and the international sanctions (now lifted), which is causing major difficulties for citizens, such as high inflation, continuous power cuts and non-payment of civil servants. Despite maintaining moderate growth rates based on cereal, cotton and mining (gold mining) activity and a significant volume of remittances from one of the continent's largest diasporas, the Malian economy continues to be weighed down by an extreme poverty rate of 20.8% (2021) of the population, and a ranking of 188 (out of 193) on the Human Development Index, without the junta having so far been able to adopt sufficient measures to reverse the serious situation.

 

Conclusion

 

‘To create together the best conditions for a civilian political transition leading to credible general elections, for the exercise of democracy through a roadmap that lays the foundations for a new Mali’. The laudable declaration of intent of the junta imposed by self-coup in 2021 seems to be unravelling at an accelerated pace, before it has even became a minimally democratic experiment. Its increasing isolation, both externally - after expelling Western partners in favour of Moscow - and internally - by marginalising the northern populations and indefinitely suspending elections and disturbing the activity of political parties - is reminiscent of the country's worst moments and is seriously affecting the well-being of the population, which is beginning to suffer from the disastrous political and economic scene. 

 

Internationally, but above all in the eyes of their own public opinion, Goïta and his junta will have great difficulty defending a different transition attempt, or appealing to a post-colonial ‘model of their own’, if it is based on an abusive and overly prolonged exercise of power to the detriment of the population itself, imposing an authoritarian and anti-democratic drift that restricts any political participation - or directly excludes it, as in the case of Azawad -, incorporates foreign elements of very dubious reputation, and ultimately has an impact on a generalised worsening of the economic situation. 

 

It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the junta will return to a democratic path that truly legitimises its supposedly pan-African emancipation project or whether, with the support of its new partners, it will be the umpteenth example of personalist and authoritarian government, as unfortunately has been seen on other occasions in the independent Republic of Mali.