DEAL OF THE CENTURY, FOR WHOM? NORMALISATION OF UAE-BAHRAIN-ISRAEL RELATIONS

On 15 September, the governments of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain officially recognised the State of Israel, making them the third and fourth countries in the Arab world to do so, after Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1995). The agreements, signed at the initiative and under the auspices of the White House, have been dubbed the "Abraham Accords" by the Trump administration, symbolically referring to the "father" of the three religions in the region. In reality, they are bilateral agreements, signed under the name of 'Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalisation' in the case of the UAE, and 'Declaration of Peace, Cooperation and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations' in the case of Bahrain.

These 'peace' agreements are intended as an extension of the so-called "Deal of the Century", adopted by President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu earlier this year. This plan, strongly criticised on several fronts (especially by the Palestinian National Authority, absent from the agreement), envisaged (i) a territorial distribution between the two future states clearly favourable to Israel, which would definitively annex the West Bank settlements, while the Palestinian state would be made up of an "archipelago" of territories without continuity and whose surface area represents 15% of Palestine under British mandate, (ii) Palestinian dependence on Israeli security and the Israeli army, (iii) more limited Palestinian access to water sources than at present, and (iv) recognition of the capitals of the two states, with Jerusalem as that of Israel and Abu Dis (a suburb east of Jerusalem) as that of Palestine. In return, the Palestinians would receive investments worth up to $50 billion, mostly from Persian Gulf Arab countries and the US.

Although it has been criticised that the Abraham Accords are not really peace treaties (since there has been no armed conflict between the parties) and that they simply put on paper what was an open secret, making public relations - especially economic ones - that had been going on for years, the fact is that the recognition of the State of Israel by the two small Persian Gulf monarchies is set to trigger important geopolitical changes in the entire region. In this article we analyse how this historic step affects both its protagonists (including the US) and the other countries in the region, as well as other actors in global geopolitics.

- United Arab Emirates. Although until recently the small Persian Gulf state lacked real relevance on the international stage (beyond its vast oil deposits or its interest in tourism and as an intercontinental hub), Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan has managed to place the UAE under the spotlight of global diplomatic and media attention and, through important steps such as the recognition of the State of Israel, aims to gain a leading position in the geopolitical balance of the region. Not surprisingly, the Accords are part of an important economic development strategy that seeks to diversify the Emirates' predominantly oil-based economy, migrating towards other renewable energies (it has recently inaugurated its first nuclear power plant, and is planning the world's largest solar energy project with French companies) and developing prominently in the technology, cybersecurity, aerospace, defence and security sectors. This is where collaboration with Israeli industry, a leader in all these fields, plays a key role. Not surprisingly, the signed Treaty contains a call for cooperation between the two states in the aforementioned sectors, as well as in others of strategic importance such as the environment, health, tourism, energy and agriculture, in which it seems that the two countries have been maintaining discreet contacts (through intermediaries such as Egypt) in recent years. 

Secondly, the Accords have an undeniable political value for the UAE, which thus acquires a very important voice and role in the geopolitics of the region by becoming the third Arab state to recognise the state of Israel. In doing so, it has reportedly succeeded in suspending Israeli plans for annexation of the West Bank, thus arguing that only through recognition can pressure be brought to bear on the Jewish state to achieve the future realisation of a Palestinian state. On the other hand, by recognising Israel, the UAE secures an important strategic ally in the region. In this sense, although the UAE has warned that the Accords do not directly target any state, the UAE may see Iran as a regional power to be countered in the coming years, both because of its geographical proximity (they are only 70 km apart) and in the context of the UAE's military action against the Houthis in Yemen, who are backed by Iran. A similar situation occurs with Erdogan's Turkey, with which the UAE clashes on some key international issues such as the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in the UAE, protected by Turkey), the war in Libya (where the UAE supports -along with France, Russia, Egypt and other states- the Libyan National Army of Marshal Heftar, against the UN-recognised and Turkish-backed Government of National Accord), or the dispute in the eastern Mediterranean with Greece (in which the UAE - together with France - has expressed its firm support for Athens).

- Bahrain. Less than a month after the announcement of normalisation between the UAE and Israel, the small emirate of Bahrain declared its readiness to follow in its footsteps and become the fourth Arab country to recognise the Jewish state. In doing so, Manama publicly stated that it sought to "genuine and lasting peace, security and prosperity across the region, and for all who live there, regardless of religion, sect, ethnicity, or ideology". Certainly, by joining the normalisation process, Bahrain is carrying out a real public relations operation at the international level, while reinforcing its favourable treatment by the US (it already hosts the Fifth Fleet and has the status of Major Non-NATO Ally). It also aims, following the UAE, to gain significant economic benefits and increase trade relations with Israel's powerful industry. However, the signing of the Accords has been met with a more significant popular backlash than in the case of the UAE. It should not be forgotten that, although governed by Sunni monarchs (al-Khalifa dynasty), the majority of the Bareinese population is Shia (70 per cent), an aspect that has already been the source of revolts since the Arab Spring of 2011. This is another reason why Bahrain seems more than willing to join an intelligence and security cooperation alliance. 

- Israel. The big winner of the Accords. Despite criticism from the most ultra-conservative sector of his coalition government for the alleged waivers contained in the Accords, the truth is that Prime Minister Netanyahu - who is at a delicate moment in his handling of the pandemic - can claim to have achieved recognition unthinkable in the last 25 years, and doubly so. Although it has been suggested that one of the conditions imposed by the UAE was that Israel renounce its annexation of the West Bank, some sectors of the Hebrew government have already pointed out that the Accords were only a suspension and not a definitive renunciation of the annexation of the West Bank. However, the issue of the West Bank could have been used by Netanyahu as a bargaining chip, aware of the strong opposition that his annexation proposal contained in the Deal of the Century had generated in international circles, as well as the practical problem of annexing a territory populated mainly by Palestinians who would have to be granted citizenship and equal rights. 

Although the Hebrew state had certainly already been maintaining relations with its new 'partners', especially in economic and security matters, as well as in cooperation in the face of the COVID19 pandemic, the establishment of official relations will substantially benefit Tel Aviv and its conglomerate of companies and start-ups - especially in the technology sector - and will open the door to the landing of petrodollars in the Israeli tourism sector, attracted by the direct flights established between the three parties. It is also assumed that Israel intends to collaborate with the UAE and Bahrain, especially in diplomatic, intelligence and even military matters, in order to form a strong front against Iran and its allies in the region.

The only suspicions that can be found on the Israeli side relate to apparent promises that the US has made to the Gulf monarchies in order to secure their accession. It has been suggested that Trump has promised the UAE the sale of cutting-edge military technology - including the F-35 stealth fighter - which would be a fantastic qualitative leap for the small state and would place it at the forefront of the region in this field. In this regard, Israel and some sectors in the US have voiced opposition to the delivery of this technology, especially the F-35, arguing that it would jeopardise the necessary Hebrew military superiority (the so-called "qualitative military edge", codified in US legislation), as well as placing a cutting-edge military secret in the hands of a regime whose political evolution in the coming years cannot be foreseen. Consequently, it remains to be seen what will finally happen if there is a new "guest" in the White House in November, and whether a possible reversal of this condition will not jeopardise the survival of the Accords. In any case, in recent days it has been suggested that the solution will probably involve the delivery to the UAE of certain F-35 units without all of their technological advances and even manufactured in Israel, so that Tel Aviv can ensure its military superiority in the event of a direct conflict. 

- United States. The US is the big driver of the Accords. The Trump administration has presented it as a historic agreement for the region in the area, on a par with the Camp David or Oslo Accords. However, it could be argued that the US is taking advantage of a moment when Arab involvement in the Palestinian cause is at its lowest ebb. On the one hand, Egypt is keeping its borders with the Gaza Strip closed due to its ongoing frictions with Hamas, while the PNA appears to be quietly moving closer to Erdogan's Turkey, which has raised suspicions in the rest of the region, especially Saudi Arabia. 

In a context of an apparent US retreat from the Middle East following the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq and Syria after the defeat of Daesh, it has been suggested that Washington intends to maintain its long-standing influence in the region by creating an Arab-Israeli front that would allow it to remotely confront the Persian regime, as well as paralyse China's attempt to establish itself in the region through economic ties projected along its modern Silk Road. Trump is thus managing to forge alliances that will surely endure over time and shape US policy in the region for years to come, regardless of who occupies the White House after November. Indeed, it has been said that the achievement of the Accords will not have much impact on the polls, given the limited influence of foreign policy on Donald Trump's majority electorate. 

The role played by Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, in securing the Accords is key. Despite his political and diplomatic inexperience, the 39-year-old special adviser to the president has managed to bring about Agreements that, while not definitively influencing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, constitute a very important step in the transformation of regional geopolitics. A close friend of Prime Minister Netanyahu, heir to a real estate tycoon and backed by the powerful pro-Israel Evangelical Church in the US, he boasts of having read 25 books on the conflict (an aspect that earned him some criticism) and of having met with all the parties involved over the past two years to design the Accords, including Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas. However, he has sharply criticised Abbas for not joining the understanding, despite proposing at the time to join the Deal of the Century, which promised substantial investment for the Palestinian territories, nor the Abraham Accords, despite involving the suspension of Israel's annexation of the West Bank. 

From an economic point of view, the Accords are extraordinarily favourable for Washington, as they mean increased defence sales to the signatories, especially the aforementioned F-35 stealth fighters that are in such high demand by the UAE in order to achieve military leadership in the region. Although, as has been explained, the sale may face certain obstacles, one way or another the potential of the Accords is enormous for the US war industry. Moreover, the US can also take advantage of the explosion of exchanges between the signatories, such as in energy, where it has already been announced that the three countries will develop a joint strategy. 

- Palestinians. They call themselves the big losers of the Abraham Accords. Not surprisingly, the Palestinian National Authority - through its president Mahmoud Abbas - has described the step taken by its Arab partners as a "stab in the back" and has stated that it will review its relations with the Arab League. However, there has so far been no violent popular reaction from the 'Arab street' to the news. Thus, beyond small rallies in various towns in the Palestinian territories, there has not been the uprising that might be expected at other times in the face of a statement of such magnitude. Nor has the protest been massively transferred to the internet, beyond various inflammatory tweets or boycott initiatives such as the one launched by the UAE Anti-Normalisation Association, which has apparently been backed by a million online signatures, mainly from Palestinians, but also from citizens of Bahrain and, to a lesser extent, the UAE. Voices outside the Palestinian government, on the other hand, criticise the Palestinian National Authority's 'overreaction', denouncing its failure to seize the momentum and appreciate the long-term benefits for reconciliation between the two peoples and the eventual recognition of a Palestinian state. Thus, some argue that only through the normalisation of relations can Israel be pressured towards peace, and it is not in vain that it is precisely normalisation on the part of the UAE that has made it a condition for Israel to halt its plans for annexation of the West Bank.  

- Saudi Arabia. The great absentee from the picture of the Abraham Accords, although present in everyone's mind. It has been pointed out that the Accords could not have happened without its approval, given the close friendship between the House of Saud and the UAE, as well as its political and economic support for the Bahrain monarchy. The addition of the Saudi giant would be a much more significant development and would have much wider geopolitical repercussions for the region, although it is not likely to happen any time soon. It should be noted that the current King Salman was just behind King Faisal when the latter gave his 1973 speech defending the oil embargo as a rejection of the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War, is a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause and a driving force behind the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. President Trump himself acknowledged on the day of the signing of the Accords that Saudi Arabia's accession will come "in due course". 

However, the coming accession to the throne of Prince Mohammed bin Salman (known as MBS) and his undeniable influence in almost all areas of government (he is deputy prime minister, president of the Council for Economic and Development Affairs, president of the Council for Political and Security Affairs and minister of Defence) may radically change the situation. Thus, it has been argued that the young prince would be in favour of joining the pact, given the advantages that can be derived from it. On the one hand, of a political nature, by recognising in Israel a strong ally in its dispute with Iran for supremacy in the region and in the Muslim world. On the other hand, of an economic nature, as recognition of the Hebrew state would give Riyadh access to Israel's cutting-edge technology, which is necessary for economic growth and the development of its own competitiveness within the framework of the 'Vision 2030', especially in terms of diversification of the energy sector, but also in the fields of tourism, urban planning and agricultural development. In reality, as in the case of the UAE and Bahrain, it seems that "discreet" contacts between Riyadh and Tel Aviv have been taking place in recent years and, although recognition will not be possible in the short term, the former will probably make gestures or concessions, such as the announced opening of its airspace to flights between the signatories of the Accords. 

However, it seems that in any case, despite the undeniable advantages of accession, taking such a decision will not be easy for the House of Saud. Mainly because Saudi society remains overwhelmingly opposed to recognising Israel. Moreover, it is feared that such recognition might entail ceding Saudi Arabia's current position as leader of the Sunni Muslim world, derived from its status as custodian of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, in favour of other growing pan-Islamist states such as Turkey (in the Sunni world) or Iran (in the Shia world). Therefore, it seems that recognition will not occur until a transition is effectively completed and a more favourable state of opinion exists among Saudi society.

- Oman. Although in the days following the unveiling of the Accords there was talk that Oman was likely to be the next country to join, due to Netanyahu's surprise trip there in late 2018, the Sultanate appears to have put the brakes on the expected accession despite publicly welcoming the pact. Apparently, the new Sultan is not yet willing to take such a big step in foreign policy after his recent accession to the throne, as well as not wanting to damage long-standing relations with Iran for the time being. On the other hand, however, Muscat would see these agreements as a way to improve its relations with Washington, which have deteriorated during Trump's tenure, so it is possible that it is delaying accession until there is a change in the White House next November. 

- Jordan and Egypt. The first two Arab countries to recognise the state of Israel are in a similar situation. While both have publicly welcomed the Accords, they are likely to view it with some misgivings. Firstly, because although they were the first to do so, the recognition came as part of a peace agreement after two separate conflicts (and earned them, especially Egypt, severe isolation in the region and the assassination of President Sadat), so their relationship with Israel cannot exactly be considered "friendly" either, especially as far as their citizenship is concerned. On the other hand, both Egypt and Jordan have received significant compensation and special favourable treatment from the US since their recognition, which has since recognised them as Major non-NATO allies. The entry on the scene of the Gulf monarchies could imply a reduction in these compensations at a time when they are key to their survival, given the "difficult" situation that both countries are going through, which has precisely led them to increase their collaboration in a three-way forum in which they have integrated Iraq. 

- Arab League. The League of Arab States, which since 1945 has brought together various countries stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf of Oman, has not achieved the consensus - typical of other eras - needed to issue a condemnatory statement, despite strong pressure from the PNA to do so. The latter has therefore announced its decision to resign its current presidency of the body, considering that "there is no honour in seeing Arabs scurrying towards normalisation (of relations with Israel) during its presidency (of the Arab League)". 

- Iran. One of the few voices clearly hostile to the Accords on the international scene. Not surprisingly, the Iranian president, during a televised appearance on 15 August, expressly condemned the agreement (until then only between Israel and the UAE) as betraying the aspirations of the Palestinian people and Muslims in general. For his part, the army chief of staff described the agreement as "a great disaster that threatens the security of the Islamic Republic". 

The Persian regime appears to be predicting the creation of an Arab-Israeli front against it, diminishing its power and growing influence among the Shia community in Arab countries. It is to be expected, therefore, that the Islamic Republic will seek to boycott collaboration between the new partners as much as possible, and try to seize the opportunity to establish itself as a leader in supporting the Palestinian cause. However, as the Accords gain traction and other countries join the initiative, any Iranian action against it risks further isolation. 

Moreover, the important economic relations between the UAE and Iran should not be forgotten, with a trade balance clearly in favour of the former, which is the main foreign market for Persian products given the tightening of banking and financial restrictions on Tehran. This aspect could weigh heavily on any decision Iran might take to try to boycott the pact. 

- Turkey. Despite being one of the first countries in the world to recognise Israel - in 1949 - Ankara has been outspoken in its rejection of the Accords as "political suicide" and a "betrayal" of the Palestinian cause. While tensions between Turkey and Israel have been escalating in recent years over the Palestinian dossier (with President Erdogan's broad public support for Hamas), it seems that the real reason for this abrupt reaction is Turkey's fear - like Iran - of being isolated in the Middle East, in the face of a new Arab-Israeli alliance led by the Hebrew state and the UAE, which could be unbalanced by its arch-enemy Saudi Arabia (with which it is in a clear struggle for leadership of the Sunni Muslim world). Moreover, as mentioned above, Turkey has a tense disagreement with the UAE in the eastern Mediterranean (both in the dispute over control of the waters - where the UAE gesturally supports Greece - and in Libya - where they back different sides) and in relation to the role of the Muslim Brotherhood. 

- Kuwait. The small Emirate - mourning the recent death of Emir Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, a true mediator in the region - seems the most reluctant of the current members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) to join and even welcome the Abraham Accords. Not surprisingly, Kuwait City is home to a sizeable Palestinian diaspora, and conciliatory support for the cause comes both from its administration and from Kuwaiti society itself (which is composed of a large Shia minority). For this reason, it seems unlikely to join the Accords in the medium term, except perhaps to avoid being isolated in the event that its large neighbour Saudi Arabia does so. 

- Qatar. It has so far made no official statement, although it seems unwilling to recognise anything other than the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and the two-state solution, despite its good relations - discreetly - with Israel. In recent years, it has been severely isolated by its GCC neighbours and Egypt due to its defence of the Muslim Brotherhood and relations with Turkey and Iran. However, the US is trying its best to bring it into the pact, and is already considering granting it the status of 'Major Non-NATO Ally', which brings great benefits in terms of access to funding and military hardware from Washington. 

- Russia. Although there has been no official reaction to the Accords, Moscow seems to maintain an ambivalent position. On the one hand, Putin has very good relations with Netanyahu and Russia could applaud the pact for the stability it could bring to the region. However, in recent times it has been asserting that no final peace can be achieved without a two-state solution, and urges the international community not to forget the Palestinians. Not surprisingly, Moscow continues to keep the various Palestinian factions on its agenda, as evidenced by Minister Lavrov's meetings earlier this year with both Hamas and Fatah. 

- European Union. Europe, especially France and Germany, stress the importance of the Accords and call on more countries to join them as a way to bring peace to the region. However, European countries urge that the Accords should also serve to resume dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis with a view to a two-state solution, and that the suspension of the annexation of the West Bank should be definitive.

- China. Despite welcoming the pact, China has maintained its strategy of recent years of not positioning itself too strongly in the Middle East conflicts, which has allowed it to develop economic relations with all the actors involved without having to make a clear choice in favour of one or the other. Internally, China welcomes any pact aimed at pacifying and stabilising the region, as this favours its commercial interests and the expansion of its Silk Road (the Belt and Road Initiative explained here), although certain sectors in Beijing fear that the Accords could, on the contrary, increase polarisation and tensions in the region. China has strong economic ties with both the UAE and Israel, especially in security and high technology sectors, and is therefore keen for its trading partners to engage with each other. However, Beijing is aware of the need to be especially cautious with its other trading partner in the region, Iran, which is currently in a delicate situation (following the US withdrawal from JSOC and increased pressure on the Persian regime) and has declared itself threatened by these Accords. 

Conclusions. On the one hand, the signing of the Accords materialises the possibility of reaching understandings between countries - hitherto at loggerheads - aimed at increasing stability in the region, thus breaking with the idea - firmly established - that the Arab states could not reach diplomatic agreements with Israel due to their ideological confrontation on the Palestinian issue. Moreover, it raises hopes in the international community that more countries will join in, in what would be very important steps towards a - hopefully coming - peace between Israelis and Palestinians. 

In this process towards normalisation, it is also good news that the new generations, represented by Jared Kushner and Prince Mohammed of Saudi Arabia, can provide a new approach to a regional conflict that was entrenched long before they were born. 

On the other hand, however, it should not be forgotten that despite being presented as a historic breakthrough, the Abraham Accords do not constitute a true peace treaty, nor do they definitively address the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, nor do they alter in any way the situation of the three current conflicts in the Middle East (Syria, Yemen, Libya). Therefore, although they are an important step towards stability in the region, they do not seem likely to bring peace to the region in the short term, at least not until the entry or accession of other key players (PNA, Saudi Arabia).

On another level, the Accords consolidate US influence in the region. Despite its apparent retreat in the region over the last year, the alliances forged by Trump allow the US to be without being, preserving its role as an essential power in the region with the declared aim of isolating Iran and, at the same time, preventing China or Russia from taking advantage of the vacuum left by the American contingent.  

Finally, as for our immediate surroundings, the European Union is sticking to its line: it is neither there nor to be expected. Brussels remains much more preoccupied with its own problems (pandemic, immigration, Brexit) and, far from acting as a common front in the diplomatic field, its members (especially Germany and France) continue to act on their own in important international issues such as this. Indeed, High Representative Borrell has limited himself to welcoming the Accords, having shortly before urged Israel to definitively cancel plans for the annexation of the West Bank. However, his absence from the picture makes clearer than ever the EU's growing irrelevance in Middle East geopolitics, at least as a regional actor. Germany, meanwhile, has already hosted the first meeting between Israel and the UAE following the signing of the Accords.