DJIBOUTI, A GEOPOLITICAL LABORATORY IN THE RED SEA
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| "djibouti" by The U.S. Army is licensed with CC BY 2.0. |
Its privileged location and relative political stability have turned tiny Djibouti into an improvised testing ground where the "neighbouring" presence of countries such as China, the US, France and Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly offer us a small-scale scenario of global geopolitics in the coming years.
Background
Despite its lack of exploitable natural resources, the fact that the desert prevents agriculture and that the only major activity is fishing, tiny Djibouti is one of the most flourishing economies in the region, with sustained economic growth rates of close to 6% per annum. However, this growth does not translate into improved living conditions for its population, as the country ranks 190th on the human development index and 23% of Djiboutians live in extreme poverty. Moreover, the economy is extremely dependent on neighbouring Ethiopia, with 95% of Ethiopia's maritime imports passing through its ports.
The privileged location is coupled with the relative political stability that has characterised the independent republic since its foundation. In this sense, although it cannot be described as a dictatorial regime, it has been a de facto one-party political system in which there have only been two presidents - from the same family - in more than forty years: the current president - Ismail Omar Guelleh - succeeded his uncle - Hassan Gouled Aptidon - in 1997, although he was part of the delegation that negotiated independence with France in 1977. Furthermore, Djibouti is an oasis in the region in terms of terrorist activity, which is scarce despite occasional acts such as the attack claimed by Al Shabaab in a restaurant in the capital in 2014, which caused three deaths and eleven injuries (including several foreign soldiers).
The significant foreign presence and Djibouti's role in regional geopolitics
The two aforementioned factors, which are certainly uncommon in other neighbouring countries, have led the major world powers to set their sights on the small African state and in recent years to disembark on the ground in an attempt to take advantage -both economically and militarily- of its undeniable geographical advantage. In this process of disembarkation, the presence of the major powers China and the US, the more limited presence of other nations such as France, Italy and Japan (and the surprising absence of Russia), as well as, finally, the role that Djibouti can also play in the geopolitics of its more powerful regional neighbours, are particularly noteworthy.
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| Fuente: "China's Engagement in Djibouti", Congressional Research Service, using ESRI and US State Department data |
After 9/11, the US decided to establish what is now its only permanent base on African soil. It currently deploys some 3,000-4,000 troops continuously at Camp Lemonnier (a former French base next to Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport) to train local forces (the Djiboutian army has some 10,500 troops), operate drones, deploy fighter jets, and deploy intervention forces throughout the Horn of Africa and Yemen, especially in counter-terrorism operations. Not surprisingly, it seems that drone activity became so intense that it had to be moved to a French-operated airstrip in the interior, given the interference with commercial flight operations and complaints from Djiboutian air traffic controllers.
For its part, despite being the last country to land in Djibouti (2017), China has done so in a big way, acquiring facilities next to the port of Doraleh that consist of a helicopter landing strip (which, due to its size, would not allow aircraft), several buildings for the troops deployed (around 700 troops), as well as a 600-metre pier that would allow several large vessels to dock. Despite the clear military orientation of the base, the official reason put forward by Beijing is to have a "logistical base" to support its commercial operations, as well as the fight against piracy and transnational terrorism. Others point to the possible need for a rapid evacuation point for thousands of Chinese workers spread throughout Africa, especially in the continent's most troubled areas (Libya, Somalia, Yemen). Finally, from a strategic point of view, the military presence in Djibouti allows China to acquire international prestige, achieving a status of global actor similar to that of potential contenders such as the US or France, as well as achieving a deterrent effect towards its rival India, since together with its future presence in the Pakistani port of Gwadar and in the Maldives, the establishment in the Red Sea provides Beijing with a fleet outside the China Sea and therefore invulnerable to a potential blockade of the Strait of Malacca.
From an economic point of view, the location is key for Beijing and, not surprisingly, it has invested heavily in infrastructure development in what it intends to make its entry point into the Horn of Africa and a key piece in the 'string of pearls' of its new maritime silk route, integrating Djibouti as a privileged partner in its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Read what we have already written about the BRI in our article "The Belt and Road Initiative: Geopolitical Impact for Spain and the EU".
To this end, and as a result of disputes between the Djiboutian government and the Emirati company DP World over an alleged corruption scandal, China Merchant Holdings took over the concession for the container terminal at the port of Doraleh in 2018, which it has since expanded considerably. In addition, the port has direct access to the new international gauge railway line linking Djibouti to the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, which is key to bringing Chinese manufacturing into the East African hinterland and has also been heavily funded by the Asian giant.
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| "File:Map of Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway.png" by Skilla1st is licensed with CC BY-SA 4.0. |
At the same time, this route is equally essential in the other direction, as it aims to favour the import of crude oil from South Sudan through Ethiopia and allows for the sustained economic development of both transit countries, potential consumers of Chinese products, which are also provided with water pipelines (operated by Chinese concessionaires) and telecommunications infrastructure (even financing and putting into orbit Ethiopia's first observation satellite).
- Europe and Japan
Despite recognising the independence of the new Republic of Djibouti at the time, France never completely abandoned the territory. Initially, through an agreement to protect the new state from its neighbours (at the time Ethiopia and Somalia, in the orbit of the USSR). Over time, however, Paris has become well aware of the strategic value of the Djiboutian enclave and has maintained a strong presence over the years. The forces deployed in Djibouti represent the largest French contingent in Africa and one of the two forward operating bases on the continent. They have a permanent strength of 1,500 troops, as well as air assets (including four Mirage 2000-5 fighters and several helicopters) and naval assets, thanks to the use of their own bases. This contingent provides it with a rapid reaction force that can be deployed in the event of a crisis in the region (Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean), as well as contributing to international anti-piracy operations (Ocean Shield, Atalanta) off the coast of Somalia. Precisely within the framework of these operations, the French bases also host a large number of German and Spanish troops.
The fight against piracy was also initially the reason for the disembarkation of Japanese troops in 2007, through a modest contingent (around 150 troops) housed in a small base close to the US base. However, in 2016 Tokyo decided to expand the base and its troops to 600. Officially, in order to allow for the possible evacuation of Japanese citizens in the event of a regional crisis, but informally as a means of counteracting the imminent landing of Chinese troops and Beijing's growing influence in the area. The Djibouti base is thus the first overseas base for Japan, which is thus adopting a much more expeditionary stance than it has maintained in recent decades, in contrast to its own Constitution (drafted at the end of World War II), which is considered pacifist -not in vain does it prevent the active use of force and its troops from fighting abroad-, despite the reform carried out in 2014 that seeks to include this operation in the concept of "collective self-defence".
Lastly, in terms of troop volume, Italy also decided to establish itself in the small country by opening its own permanent military base in 2013. It has around 100 troops located at a small base outside the capital. With interests in the area since colonial times, Italy is also aware of the enclave's high strategic value and its main objective is, like France, to facilitate rapid deployment in the event of a crisis as well as to participate in operations against maritime piracy.
After listing all the countries with a military presence, the conspicuous absence of Russian troops on the ground is surprising. According to some analysts, Russia does not see the Horn of Africa as a strategic region of the highest level for its interests, and has so far shown little interest in maintaining a permanent base in the area. However, it seems that its opinion may have changed in recent years, and it has already sounded out the Djiboutian government, which, although it initially seemed open to considering the option, considering Russia to be "a key player, a permanent member of the Security Council" (statements by Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf), it has subsequently expressly denied the possibility, fearing that the presence would be used "to intervene in Syria" (statements by the same minister in 2017).
- Regional geopolitics.
Djibouti also plays an important role in the geopolitics of the region. As a country with a Sunni Muslim majority, it is located in the orbit of Saudi Arabia, with whom relations are excellent. In 2015, Djibouti was part of the coalition formed by Riyadh against the Houthis in Yemen and was quick to position itself in favour of the Saudis in the crisis with Qatar (which ultimately led to the withdrawal of the Qatari peacekeeping contingent on the Djiboutian-Eritrean border and the occupation by Asmara of a small disputed territory). Moreover, Riyadh is reportedly very close to establishing a permanent base in the small country, to be used as a launching point for its actions in Yemen, but although the agreement was announced at the end of 2016, few details are known about the eventual presence.
Read more about Yemen's never-ending conflict in our article "How many wars can be fought in Yemen? The multiple actors involved make peace more difficult".
In contrast, relations with the UAE have been very complicated in recent years. Seeing it as a key point for the expansion of its political and economic interests in the region, Abu Dhabi secured a 30-year concession for the important Doraleh container terminal in 2006, financing its construction and expansion through the company DP World. However, in 2014 the Djiboutian government accused the company of having obtained the concession by bribing a senior port authority official (until then a close associate of President Guelleh), cancelling the contract and renationalising control of the terminal in 2018, which it entrusted to China Merchant Holdings shortly afterwards. Far from remaining unmoved, Abu Dhabi has succeeded in getting several London courts and the London Court of Arbitration to agree with it, condemning Djibouti to a hefty compensation and to bear the costs of the arbitration). To make matters worse, the UAE has managed to circumvent Djibouti's rudeness by establishing itself in its coastal neighbours, Eritrea and the de facto independent Somali region of Somaliland: it has obtained - again through DP World - the concession for the important port of Berbera (Somaliland), has a military base in Eritrea (used in its campaign in Yemen) and plans to open another in Somaliland. Not surprisingly, by obtaining the port of Berbera (in joint venture with the Ethiopian government) it aims to compete with Djibouti's Doraleh port for large imports to the Horn of Africa. Similarly, Abu Dhabi has reportedly played a key role in the rapprochement and restoration of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, leading to the signing of a friendship treaty, the opening of embassies and the joint development of the Red Sea port, which could become another important competitor for Djibouti. All this has led to a serious deterioration in diplomatic relations with the small country, which sees its essential port traffic threatened by both new enclaves.
As for the other actors in the region, Djibouti also follows the line set by Riyadh, which is why it broke off diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016 after the assaults on Saudi diplomatic missions in that country (a measure that was received with derision by Iranian society).
As for another increasingly important actor in the region, Turkey, Ankara has so far shown little interest in the small Republic of Djibouti. However, its interests in the region are focused on the establishment of a military base in Somalia, a country over which it would exert significant political influence.
More broadly, Djibouti has refused to join the recent US-sponsored Abraham Accords for the time being. President Guelleh has stated that his country will not establish ties with Israel until it makes peace with the Palestinians, "who are denied their inalienable rights", although he points out that he has "no problem with the Jews as a people or with the Israelis as a nation".
Read more about the Abraham Accords in our article "Deal of the Century, for whom? The normalisation of UAE-Bahrain-Israel relations".
Foresight
In view of the reasons explained above, the small state of Djibouti is set to attract the international media attention in the years to come.
On the one hand, managing the presence of major power troops in such a small space will be no easy task. Usually separated by several thousand kilometres, in this small African redoubt the armies of the US and China are separated by only 10 kilometres, so it will be interesting to observe under the Djiboutian microscope how the giants that will be the protagonists in the struggle for world leadership in the coming decades interact. For the moment, while Washington would be understandably wary of Chinese troops landing so close to its only permanent base in Africa, its current intention is to normalise relations in an enclave that is a long way from their respective mainland territories, maintaining cordial diplomatic relations. However, with an eye on securing access to key infrastructures for its presence in the country, such as the port of Doraleh and the international airport, where any threat could alter the peaceful relations practised so far.
For its part, China has denied that its troop presence has any military motive, but rather that it is intended to provide purely logistical support and backing for its ambitious economic objectives. In this sense, although the reasons put forward by Beijing seem legitimate and certainly probable, the fact remains that the huge investments made by China - initially in Djibouti but with the aim of extending to the rest of East Africa - will allow Beijing to exponentially increase its economic - and, consequently, political-strategic - influence over the entire region. In the case of Djibouti, three quarters of its foreign debt is due to Chinese loans for infrastructure development, which, according to the IMF, places the country at "high risk of debt distress". Thus, Western countries such as the US and France fear that, as has already happened in other cases (for example, the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka), non-payment of the debt contracted could lead to China taking over the financed infrastructure, which would then control everything from the profits to who does - or does not - use it. In this way, it has been suggested that by financing unviable macro-projects in developing countries, China would not only obtain important benefits from an economic perspective, but could also obtain key assets that would allow it to tilt the geopolitical balance in its favour, especially in a key strategic point such as the Bab el Mandeb strait and the Horn of Africa.
This growing Chinese influence, already predicted as a challenge to the US for several years, will for the first time also affect the big players in the region. Thus, what the Persian Gulf monarchies intended to make their sphere of influence may quickly pass into other hands before they have even had a chance to establish themselves in the area. Although politically the small country would be in Saudi Arabia's orbit, the need for investment means that the countries of the Horn of Africa have turned mainly towards the Asian giant in search of what the West has been unwilling to provide, or at least not on the same terms as Beijing. The UAE also views the Chinese presence with ambivalence: on the one hand, the arrival of Chinese investment and companies has taken away the UAE's role as banker of Djiboutian infrastructure, as seen, for example, in the withdrawal of the Doraleh port concession from DP World to give it to China Merchant Holding. However, the UAE does not want this incident to cloud its relations with China, which are currently excellent. The UAE has so far been a preferential partner of Beijing in the MENA region, with bilateral trade growing at a rate of 10% per year (mainly in crude oil and natural gas), and 60% of Chinese exports to the region passing through Emirati ports. Abu Dhabi thus aims to become a strategic partner in the Belt and Road Initiative, increasingly collaborating in those ports in the region that it already controls, and nurturing relations with Beijing that could exponentially enrich both.
It is therefore likely that Djibouti will bear the brunt of this game of interests. After the rebuff to the UAE on the Doraleh port issue (and the subsequent judicial setback it suffered), Djibouti has encountered an influential actor that may jeopardise the exploitation of its privileged location and its profitable relations with Ethiopia. Thus, the UAE has acted swiftly in its search for alternatives, setting up its military base in Eritrea and its logistical port in Somaliland, so that it is no longer dependent on the Djiboutian enclave to control the strait and access the Horn of Africa. Moreover, by developing its neighbours and fostering Eritrean-Ethiopian peace, it may open the door to increased regional competition that would only be detrimental to the interests of Djibouti's hitherto monopoly. Worse still, such port alternatives may affect its strategic relationship with Addis Ababa, which will now be able to choose from a wider range of possibilities for its incoming and outgoing maritime trade.
Finally, Djibouti will have to be very careful not to become a new theatre of regional conflicts, especially the cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran - both of which seek to take advantage of areas of instability - as well as the push for terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
In conclusion, competition and disputes between the different "tenant" countries (and other elements such as piracy and terrorism) could generate instability in the small country, which could be forced to choose sides or favour some investments and presences over others. At the same time, the pacification of its neighbours may cause it to lose its current monopoly position as the only enclave of political stability and guardian of the Bab el Mandeb. There are therefore many factors to monitor in the coming years that will allow us to determine whether Djibouti will indeed become a "gate of lamentations" for one of the many actors present or, on the contrary, for the Djiboutian people themselves.
